

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 118510
ORIGIN NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 SIG-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 EA-10 IO-13 OMB-01 /088 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:MHORNBLOW:SO/DE
APPROVED BY P - MR. NEWSOM
NEA:PLANDE
NEA/IRN:MGREENE
IRN:GGRIFIN
NSC:TTHORNTON/BARTHOLEMEW

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 118510

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CENTO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF CENTO COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES ON AFGHANIS-
TAN

REF: ANKARA 3400

1. YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR AN ORAL BRIEF-
ING OF THE CENTO DEPUTIES. ANY POLICY GUIDANCE ABOUT "HOW
THE THREAT TO THE CENTO REGION IS AFFECTED" BY THE NEW
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AFGHAN SITUATION WOULD BE PREMATURE AND SPECULATIVE.
AT OUTSET B;L,EV- WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF
IRAN AND PAKISTAN AND INDICATE OUR STRONG INTEREST IN THEIR
VIEWS.
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THE SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN
STRONG AND OF CONCERN TO US. OUR POLICY HAS BEEN TO PROVIDE

OPPORTUNITIES FOR AFGHANISTAN TO KEEP ITS LINES OPEN AND PRESERVE A MAXIMUM DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET CONTROL. OUR CONCERN WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS THAT IT NOT PASS UNDER COMPLETE SOVIET DOMINATION AND DENY ACCESS TO US, OTHER CENTO PARTIES, AND OTHER NATIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD. WE VIEW WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE POSED BY AN AFGHANISTAN DOMINATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE ABILITY AND DESIRE

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3. WE BELIEVE COUP WAS MOUNTED IN RESPONSE TO DAOUD GOVERNMENT'S ARREST OF SEVEN COMMUNIST LEADERS ON APRIL 25. THERE IS CURRENTLY NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE TO INDICATE SOVIETS WERE INVOLVED IN PLANNING OR EXECUTION OF COUP BUT THEY MAY WELL HAVE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE.

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4. OVER NEAR TERM, THE MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL AND FORMULATE ITS POLICIES. LOOKING AHEAD WE SEE POSSIBILITY OF TENSIONS WITHIN KHALQ LEADERSHIP AND BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS.

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NEA/PAB:MHORNBLOW

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INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 118510

FOL RPT STATE 118510 SENT ACTION ANKARA INFO LONDON
TEHRAN ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI MOSCOW KABUL MAY 9, 1978.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 118510

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CENTO

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INFO RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0000

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

S E C R E T STATE 118510

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 118510 ACTION ANKARA INFO LONDON,
TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW AND KABUL MAY 09.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 118510

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 118510

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 118510 ACTION ANKARA INFO LONDON TEHRAN
ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI MOSCOW KABUL MAY 9.

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TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 118510

FOL STATE 118510 SENT ACTION ANKARA INFO LONDON TEHRAN
ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI MOSCOW KABUL MAY 9, 1978 REPEATED TO
YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 118510

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CENTO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF CENTO COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES ON AFGHANIS-
TAN

REF: ANKARA 3400

1. YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR AN ORAL BRIEF-
ING OF THE CENTO DEPUTIES. ANY POLICY GUIDANCE ABOUT "HOW
THE THREAT TO THE CENTO REGION IS AFFECTED" BY THE NEW
AFGHAN SITUATION WOULD BE PREMATURE AND SPECULATIVE.
AT OUTSET B;L,EV- WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF
IRAN AND PAKISTAN AND INDICATE OUR STRONG INTEREST IN THEIR
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STRONG AND OF CONCERN TO US. OUR POLICY HAS BEEN TO PROVIDE
OPPORTUNITIES FOR AFGHANISTAN TO KEEP ITS LINES OPEN AND
PRESERVE A MAXIMUM DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET CON-
TROL. OUR CONCERN WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS THAT IT NOT

PASS UNDER COMPLETE SOVIET DOMINATION AND DENY ACCESS TO US, OTHER CENTO PARTIES, AND OTHER NATIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD. WE VIEW WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE POSED BY AN AFGHANISTAN DOMINATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE ABILITY AND DESIRE

OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO STAY FREE OF SOVIET DOMINATION IS STILL UNCLEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALMOST ANY AFGHAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD WANT TO MAINTAIN A DEGREE OF FREEDOM FROM THE SOVIET UNION. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN BROADEN AFGHANISTAN'S TIES AND LIMIT ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, THE DANGERS TO THE CENTO AREA WILL BE REDUCED. AS WE ASSESS THE NEW SITUATION OVER TIME, WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO ESTIMATE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INFLUENCING THE AFGHAN REGIME IN DIRECTIONS FAVORABLE TO US.

3. WE BELIEVE COUP WAS MOUNTED IN RESPONSE TO DAOUD GOVERNMENT'S ARREST OF SEVEN COMMUNIST LEADERS ON APRIL 25. THERE IS CURRENTLY NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE TO INDICATE SOVIETS WERE INVOLVED IN PLANNING OR EXECUTION OF COUP BUT THEY MAY WELL HAVE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE.

4. OVER NEAR TERM, THE MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL AND FORMULATE ITS POLICIES. LOOKING AHEAD WE SEE POSSIBILITY OF TENSIONS WITHIN KHALQ LEADERSHIP AND BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS.

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6. IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC POLICIES WE EXPECT PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS AND TO STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES. GIVEN THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF AFGHANISTAN, THE REGIME WILL FIND IT EXCEEDINGLY

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APPROVED BY:NEA/ARP:JWTTWINAM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANA

S E C R E T STATE 118510

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 118510 SENT ACTION JIDDA MAY 12.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 118510

FOL STATE 118510 SENT ACTION ANKARA INFO LONDON TEHRAN
ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI MOSCOW KABUL MAY 9, 1978 REPEATED TO
YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 118510

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CENTO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF CENTO COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES ON AFGHANIS-
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Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, POLICIES, RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGS
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Executive Order: GS
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2743828
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRIEFING OF CENTO COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES ON AFGHANIS- TAN
TAGS: PORG, AF, CENTO
To: ANKARA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6801b1a1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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